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Background:	   Bioeconomics	   combines	   methods	   from	   the	  
biological	   study	   of	   living	   resources,	   particularly	   population	  
dynamics,	   with	   methods	   of	   economic	   analysis.	   Most	  
applications	   have	   been	   in	   program	   design	   for	   resource	  
management.	  Although	  formative	  evaluations	  often	  deal	  with	  
potential	   improvements	   to	   design	   based	   on	   examination	   of	  
the	  program	  at	  some	  point	  in	  the	  early	  or	  middle	  period	  of	  its	  
life,	   there	   has	   been	   little	   interplay	   between	   bioeconomic	  
modelling	   and	   evaluation	   of	   programs	   in	   the	   context	   of	  
fisheries	  management	  programs.	  
	  
Purpose:	  This	  paper	  describes	  the	  potential	  synergy	  between	  
the	  analytic	  modelling	  techniques	  from	  bioeconomics	  and	  the	  





Intervention:	   We	   focus	   on	   how	   feedback	   from	   qualitative	  
formative	  evaluation	  methods	   could	  be	  used	   to	   improve	   the	  
development	   and	   use	   of	   realistic	   bioeconomic	   models	   to	  
inform	   program	   design,	   which	   would	   in	   turn	   improve	  
formative	  evaluation.	  
	  
Research	  Design:	  NA	  
	  
Data	  Collection	  and	  Analysis:	  NA	  
	  
Findings:	  NA	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Although the field of bioeconomics now 
encompasses many areas where the disciplines of 
biology and economics converge (e.g., Journal of 
Bioeconomics), we focus on the management of 
renewable resources, particularly fisheries. Study 
of the growth of fish stocks and the interplay 
between fish behavior and the methods used to 
catch them is key to developing a production 
function. Analyzing the role of government in 
management and the design of programs requires 
the economic modelling of all participants in the 
fishery. Scott Gordon developed a theory of the 
open-access or common-property fishery that is 
often used as a starting point for analysis (Gordon, 
1954). As the field developed, books by applied 
mathematician Colin Clark have been very 
influential, and Mathematical Bioeconomics has 
become a standard text (Clark, 1976, 2006, 2010). 
In this paper, we will argue that new realistic 
bioeconomic models related to fisheries 
management could be developed in formative 
evaluations of programs, or that existing models 
could be elaborated and revised to better conform 
with observation. 
The qualitative methods often used in 
formative evaluation could be applied to provide a 
detailed description of the constraints and 
incentives facing fishermen, and the important 
biological and ecological issues. Many 
bioeconomic models in the literature are not 
intended for application to specific situations, but 
serve the purpose of illustrating general principles 
of fisheries management. Nevertheless, we 
contend that the realism of models may be limited 
by the simplicity of the underlying assumptions, 
and opportunities for the improvement of existing 
models, or the development of new ones, may arise 
during the conduct of formative evaluations. 
Conversely, models that are more realistic would 
be useful in improving the design of programs at 
the formative evaluation stage. 
Key components of our thesis—qualitative 
methods, the methodology of economic modelling, 
and the role and methods of formative 
evaluation—are reviewed in turn. We first examine 
qualitative methods with particular attention to 
how they can be used in developing economic 
theory. Some key literature on the methodology of 
economics is then presented. Finally, the section 
on formative evaluation provides a context for our 
thesis on the application of bioeconomic models. 
The paper next turns to examples of how 
qualitative methods may be useful in developing 
and refining bioeconomic models. After 
introducing a classic bioeconomic model of 
Common Property Resources (CPR), specific 
applications of qualitative methods to the analyses 
of fisheries by the 2009 Nobel laureate in 
Economics, Elinor Ostrom, are given as examples, 
highlighting the added realism and practicality her 
analysis brings to CPR theory, in some cases 
changing the conclusions. 
We then focus on the synergy between 
methodologies, with bioeconomic models, refined 
using qualitative methods, potentially applied to 
formative evaluations. After a brief general 
discussion of the role of bioeconomic models, we 
examine Ostrom’s work and how her methods 
might be applied in evaluation. Next, we illustrate 
how qualitative methods could be used to improve 
bioeconomic models describing the potential for 
extinction of fish species. Since the risk of 
overfishing leading to extinction is a critical issue 
for fisheries management, we argue that more 
realistic bioeconomic models in this area would be 
a useful tool in formative evaluation. We conclude 
with a section presenting an example of a study 
where qualitative methods are used in the 
specification of bioeconomic models of fisheries in 
Yucatan, Mexico and point out how these models 
would be useful in formative evaluation.  
 
Qualitative	  Methods	  and	  Model	  
Development:	  Grounded	  Theory	  
 
An	  overview	  of	  Qualitative	  Methods	  
 
Qualitative researchers in the social sciences 
attempt to gain a very in-depth understanding of 
social phenomena and processes through a variety 
of methods such as interviews, focus groups, field 
observations, site visits, collection of documents, 
and case studies. Interviews may be structured 
using specific questions from an interview guide, 
much like a survey (Patton, 2002), or they may be 
unstructured, with very general questions 
designed to elicit responses that would be difficult 
to anticipate (Patton, 2002). According to Fontana 
and Frey (2000, p. 653), “The former [structured] 
aims at capturing precise data of a codable nature 
in order to explain behavior within pre-established 
categories, whereas the latter [unstructured] 
attempts to understand the complex behavior of 
members of society without imposing any a priori 
categorization that may limit the field of inquiry.” 
Focus groups, although often carefully planned, 
may go even further than unstructured interviews 
in permitting new and unanticipated themes to 
emerge. An interactive group setting, with 
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participants hearing each other’s responses, may 
stimulate new ideas and evoke memories (Patton, 
2002). When studying a particular human activity, 
observing both program participants and non-
participants in a field setting, including visits to 
sites where the activity takes place, is a standard 
qualitative method, and the resulting field notes 
are considered qualitative data (Patton, 2002, 
Chapter 6). Often such activities are accompanied 
by extensive administrative documentation that 
may be gathered by researchers and considered as 
qualitative data (Patton, 2002, pp. 293-294). All of 
these methods may be applied in case studies that 
examine particular human constructs or events in 
detail. 
A very important notion in the analysis of 
qualitative data is that of “coding.” Strauss and 
Corbin (1998, p. 3) define coding as, “The analytic 
processes through which data are fractured, 
conceptualized, and integrated to form Theory.” 
By labelling segments of the data with short 
phrases that connote themes important to the 
research, structure is added that permits further 
analysis. The context of various codes and 
relationships between them can then be analyzed. 
The frequency of codes may be reported, and, in 
some cases, researchers may even apply statistical 
analysis techniques that permit the analysis of 
discrete variables. Computer software may aid in 
the implementation and organization of the 
coding, and in analysis of the codes. 
A prominent theory of how knowledge is 
gained from such methods has been termed 
“grounded theory,” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
This approach uses the qualitative data collected to 
develop new theories or elaborations of theories, 
rather than testing established theories. The new 
theories so developed can therefore be viewed as 
empirically “grounded.” While the primary field of 
application has been sociology, the procedures 
have been used in some economic research dealing 
with complex institutional arrangements, such as 
in industry studies, analyses of the behavior of 
firms, and the analysis of market structures 
(Finch, 2002). 
 
Role	  of	  Qualitative	  Data	  in	  Developing	  
Economic	  Theory	  
 
Finch (2002) uses examples from industrial 
organization research to illustrate the role of 
grounded theory in developing economic theory. 
The procedures he reviews include coding of three 
types: open, axial, and selective. Open coding, 
intended for description, is undertaken to simply 
categorize the phenomena being researched. Axial 
coding emphasizes circumstances that may be 
perceived as opportunities by agents, and so could 
form the basis for explanations of their actions. 
Selective coding takes the final step, and codes the 
patterns and connections that may form causal 
explanations. Finch summarizes coding as, “The 
means of comparison through which explanations 
may be formulated at a level beyond each 
individual instance, and involves related activities 
of description (open coding), analysis (axial 
coding) and explanation (selective coding)” (Finch, 
2002, p. 220). 
Because grounded theory procedures are not 
well known among economists, Finch relies on 
examining the methodology of economists who 
have used qualitative methods, particularly 
fieldwork and case study techniques. He reviews 
three major contributions to industrial 
organization research. A study on research and 
development, market structure and concentration 
uses primarily detailed cases studies (Sutton, 
1998). Finch contrasts the approach used in this 
study, which uses specified models as a point of 
departure and is primarily top-down and 
deductive in approach, with the grounded theory 
method, which is bottom-up, letting the qualitative 
data suggest models. Sutton’s case studies are used 
to choose between competing game-theory 
models. Studies of the pricing decisions in 
competitive oligopoly (Andrews, 1949 and 1964), 
and of price and output decisions in large business 
organizations (Cyert and March, 1992) use 
interviews with business managers as a technique 
for developing theory, very much in the spirit of 
grounded theory. 
We will advocate a mixed approach, using 
established bioeconomic models as a point of 
departure when they are available, using 
qualitative and quantitative data to test the model 
predictions, but also using qualitative data to 
detect new issues and processes that might 
fruitfully elaborate the model, or even lead to new 
models. The complementarity of quantitative and 
qualitative methods is the theme of recent work by 
Rao and Woolcock (2003, 2005). They stress the 
complementarities of measuring and 
understanding outcomes through econometric 
methods and qualitative methods respectively. We 
place more emphasis on the role of qualitative data 
in the interplay between the deductive process in 
the specification of models and the testing that 
leads to elaboration of models. Quantitative data is 
often essential for testing models, and potentially 
refuting them. Qualitative data may cast doubt on 
model specification, although rarely as 
convincingly as quantitative data, but it has the 
advantage of improving the understanding of the 
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process being modelled, so that necessary 
refinement or alteration of the model may become 
evident. We summarize our view of 
complementary methods in Figure 1. 
 
Figure	  1.	  Complementary	  Methods	  
 
The	  Constructs	  of	  Economic	  Modelling	  
 
In this section, we step back and review economic 
modelling itself from a methodological point of 
view. We position our arguments within the 
context of competing theories of the purpose of 
modelling before returning to our main thesis on 
the value of using the qualitative methods of 
evaluation in the development of models. 
Economic modelling is in essence a positivist 
approach to economics where an economic model 
tries to explain the “what is” as opposed to the 
“what should be” of normative economics. 
According to Hands (2001, p. 48), three 
approaches constitute the body of knowledge of 
positive economics: that of Terence Hutchinson, 
that of Milton Friedman and that of Paul 
Samuelson. 
Hutchinson can be credited for transforming 
economics from a field where praxeology 
dominated, to a field where the logical positivism 
of Karl Popper was applied. Indeed, Hutchinson’s 
approach to positive economics rested on three 
criteria; the logical positivist criterion of cognitive 
meaningfulness, the logical empiricist criterion of 
empirical testability and the falsificationist 
demarcation (Hands, 2001). 
Friedman’s contribution to positive economics 
is largely due to his 1953 seminal essay “The 
Methodology of Positive Economics.” In this essay, 
Friedman advances that the truth of the 
assumptions that make up an economic theory do 
not matter as long as it is successful in making 
empirical predictions (Friedman, 1953). This 
approach, as we shall see below, has been 
criticized by some economists, particularly Alan 
Musgrave and Daniel Hausman (Hands, 2001, p. 
53). 
Samuelson’s operationalist approach to 
positive economics was key to shaping modern 
economic modelling. Samuelson considered a 
theory to have meaning in the operational sense if 
it implies some restrictions upon empirically 
observable quantities by which it could 
conceivably be refuted. An example is the 
predicted reduction of output by a firm subject to a 
per-unit tax, a result derived from a simple theory 
of the firm by the method of comparative statistics 
(Samuelson, 1947).  
Therefore, the subject of this paper is more a 
continuation of Samuelson’s approach to positivist 
economics than Friedman’s. The paper posits that 
qualitative data is used to improve science behind 
economic modelling rather than using an 
approach to economic modelling where the truth 
of assumptions in models is inconsequential.  
Indeed, there have been criticisms of 
Friedman’s approach from two angles. First, 
Musgrave has argued that there are different kinds 
of assumptions in positive economics but only 
negligibility assumptions can be ignored 
(Musgrave, 1981). According to Musgrave both 
domain (an assumption that specifies that a theory 
works in some particular domain) and heuristic 
assumptions (assumptions that are initially 
assumed to be negligible, but eventually, at a later 
stage, will be weakened to see if they have any 
impact) have an impact on the validity of the 
results of an economic model (Hand, 2001). The 
approach proposed in this paper for the use of 












Model	  elaboration	  and	  
refinement	  
Journal	  of	  MultiDisciplinary	  Evaluation	   	   	   	  
	  
5
heuristic assumptions are true. A second criticism 
of Friedman’s approach has been formulated by 
Hausman who uses the metaphor of buying a used 
car to demonstrate the logical fault in Friedman’s 
approach. In this demonstration, Hausman uses 
three arguments (Hausman, 1992): 
 
1. A good used car drives reliably (over-
simplified premise). 
2. The only test of whether a used car is a 
good used car is whether it drives reliability 
(invalidity from 1). 
3. Anything one discovers by opening the 
hood and checking the separate components of 
a used car is irrelevant to its assessment 
(trivially from 2). 
 
As shown by Hausman, a weakness of Friedman’s 
approach is that it does not allow adaptation of an 
economic model to forward-looking applications. 
Again, this paper proposes the use of qualitative 
data to ensure that underlying assumptions will 
allow a model to make accurate predictions. We 
will argue later that this is a critical requirement in 
application to formative evaluation. 
Furthermore, the interplay between deduction 
(in this case economic modelling) and induction 
(in this case based on quantitative data) has 
already been used in economics. An approach 
known as the hypothetico-deductive method 
proposes that a hypothesis leads to deduction, 
which formulates a proposition, which is then 
empirically tested. Induction can then be used 
with the results of the empirical test to revise the 
hypothesis (Dow, 2002). In fact, a well-known 
economic theory, the Philips curve, was developed 
using the hypothetico-deductive method (Dow, 
2002). 
 
Formative	  Evaluation:	  A	  Means	  for	  
Improving	  Programs	  
 
According to program evaluation theory, there are 
two major types of evaluation, which serve 
different goals (Scriven, 1967). The first is 
formative evaluation, which is designed to provide 
feedback and advice for improving a program 
(McDavid et al., 2006). In other words this type of 
evaluation is forward looking, as its overall goal is 
to help with the development of programs by 
improving performance and governance (McDavid 
et al, 2006). The second type is summative 
evaluation, which is designed to provide feedback 
and advice about whether or not a program should 
be continued, expanded or contracted (McDavid et 
al., 2006). In this case, the goal of this evaluation 
is to provide accountability to program 
stakeholders (McDavid et al., 2006). 
There is a wide range of formative evaluations 
that can be undertaken. An intrinsic or theory 
based formative evaluation is a normative 
approach where abstractly formulated 
intermediate outcomes for programs are assessed 
against a body of knowledge to test their feasibility 
(Scriven, 1967). Alternatively, a pay-off or 
empirical approach uses program data to compare 
whether it is on due course to reach its stated 
objective (Scriven, 1967). However, in practice, 
formative evaluations often use a hybrid approach 
where both elements of program theory and 
tangible realization of programs are assessed 
together in order to determine the viability of the 
program design. 
Formative evaluation can be undertaken at 
various stages of program implementation. It can 
be undertaken while the program is still in the 
conceptualization phase. It can also be used during 
the actual rollout of the program to inform 
implementation improvements as well to report on 
progress. Finally, it can also be used at the end of 
the rollout of a program to help interpret the 
implementation strategy’s impact (Stetler et al., 
2006). 
Qualitative methods are particularly suited to 
formative evaluation, where there is a need for 
depth in understanding how a program functions 
in order to recommend improvements. This has 
been noted by Patton (2002) as one of the 
contrasts with summative evaluation. 
 
Summative evaluations seldom rely 
entirely, or even primarily, on qualitative 
data and naturalistic enquiry because of 
decision makers’ interest in measuring 
standardized outcomes, having controlled 
comparisons, and making judgments 
about effectiveness from relatively larger 
samples with statistical pre-post and 
follow-up results. …Formative evaluations, 
in contrast to summative ones, serve the 
purpose of improving a specific program, 
policy, group of staff (in a personnel 
evaluation), or product. …Formative 
evaluations often rely heavily, even 
primarily, on qualitative methods. 
Findings are context specific. (Patton, 
2002, p. 219-220) 
 
Because the goals of formative evaluation 
include improving the design and implementation 
of programs, we argue that bioeconomic models, 
while often developed to inform the original design 
of programs, could, particularly if their realism is 
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improved through the use of qualitative methods, 
also be used in formative evaluation as a tool for 
revealing and addressing faulty design issues. We 
will develop this thesis further in the section 
entitled “Potential Synergy between Bioeconomic 
Modelling and Formative Evaluation of Fisheries-
Related Programs.” 
 
Application	  of	  Qualitative	  Methods	  to	  
Bioeconomic	  Modelling:	  The	  Work	  of	  
Elinor	  Ostrom	  
 
A	  Standard	  Model	  of	  a	  Common	  Property	  
Fishery	  
 
We begin by providing a sketch of a standard 
model in this section so that, in the following 
sections, we can better illustrate how Elinor 
Ostrom applies qualitative methods leading to 
modifications of the model and potentially 
different conclusions. We use Ostrom’s work as an 
example because it has been recognized as a 
profound critique of the existing literature on 
bioeconomic models of Common Property 
Resources (CPR). Colin Clark (1976) provides a 
simple statement of a CPR model of a fishery 
inspired by that of H. R. Gordon (1954). The 
model is based on the Schaefer fisheries model 
that combines a logistic growth model with 
proportional effort-harvest relationship (Schaefer, 
1957). 













⎛ −= 	   (1) 
 
where x is the size of the fish population, and K is 
the environmental carrying capacity or saturation 
level, and r is the intrinsic growth rate. 
To make this an economic model, consider a 
price p for a unit of fish and a cost c for a unit of 
effort E, so that total revenue TR = pY(E) and total 
cost TC = cE. The key economic assumption for the 
CPR fishery is that:  
 
sustainable rent = 
TR - TC = pY(E) - cE = pEx - cE = 0      (2) 
 
By setting equation (1) equal to zero and solving 
simultaneously with equation (2), we get an 









crE 1    (3) 
and an equilibrium zero-rent stock level given by: 
 
p
cx =∞           4) 
 
In this model, costs are considered what 
economists call opportunity costs: the cost of not 
undertaking the best alternative. Gordon referred 
to equations (3) and (4) as the bionomic 
equilibrium. If ∞> EE ,	   then total costs would 
exceed total revenues, so that some fishermen 
would leave the fishery, thus decreasing effort. If 
∞< EE 	  then the reverse would hold, and, because 
of the open access condition, additional fishermen 
would be attracted and effort would increase. 
Bionomic equilibrium, as predicted by the Gordon 
model, is a gloomy situation, where all of the 
economic rent that could have accrued to society, 
if effort could be constrained, is dissipated. 
The approach to model development here 
appears to make considerable use of deductive 
methods. What economists sometimes call 
“stylized facts” are noted—in this case the 
existence of fisheries that appear to yield only 
meagre income to fishermen. A model is 
constructed that is consistent with these facts by 
hypothesizing constraints and objectives for the 
fishermen, and deducing the outcome. 
In an influential article, Hardin popularized 
the phrase, “Tragedy of the commons,” to describe 
the CPR situation, as well as related situations 
such as pollution of commonly held environments 
and population increase (Hardin, 1968).  
 
Elinor	  Ostrom’s	  Approach:	  Governing	  the	  
Commons	  	  
 
Overview of her objectives and methods. Elenor 
Ostrom has analyzed qualitative data from case 
studies related to a number of CPR situations, 
including several fisheries (Ostrom, 1990). Often 
she reports a much different situation than the 
bionomic equilibrium predicted by the Gordon 
model. 
Ostrom is particularly concerned with 
proposed solutions to the CPR situation. She 
presents evidence from the literature that these 
proposals typically take one of two forms: 
introducing property rights (Privatization) or 
centralized coercive action by government 
(Leviathan). She then argues that, in practice, a 
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third way characterized by self-organization has 
often been found. 
 
Instead of presuming that the individuals 
sharing a commons are inevitably caught 
in a trap from which they cannot escape, I 
argue that the capacity of individuals to 
extricate themselves from various types of 
dilemma situation varies from situation to 
situation. The cases to be discussed in this 
book illustrate both successful and 
unsuccessful efforts to escape tragic 
outcomes. Instead of basing policy on the 
presumption that the individuals involved 
are helpless, I wish to learn more from the 
experience of individuals in field settings. 
Why have some efforts to solve CPR 
problems failed, while some have 
succeeded? What can we learn from 
experience that will help stimulate the 
development and use of a better theory of 
collective action—one that will identify the 
key variables that can enhance or detract 
from the capabilities of individuals to 
solve problems? (Ostrom, 1990, p. 14) 
 
This statement of her objectives resonates with 
the objective of qualitative methods in program 
evaluation given by Rao and Woolcock in their 
argument for mixed methods. 
 
… in conducting evaluations, quantitative 
methods are best suited to measuring 
levels and changes in impacts and to 
drawing inferences from observed 
statistical relations between those impacts 
and other covariates. They are less 
effective, however, in understanding 
process—that is, the mechanisms by which 
a particular intervention instigates a series 
of events that ultimately result in the 
observed impact. … Qualitative methods 
are particularly effective in delving deep 
into issues of process; a judicious mix of 
qualitative and quantitative methods can 
therefore help provide a more 
comprehensive evaluation of an 
intervention. (Rao and Woolcock, 2005, p. 
286) 
 
Qualitative methods help to answer the 
questions, “Why?” and “How?” In so doing, they 
may be considered to develop new models. In the 
next sections, we present two of the cases studied 
by Ostrom. In one case, the fishermen have found 
a “solution” to the CPR problem. In the other, 
circumstances prevented such a solution, and the 
Gordon model CPR equilibrium prevailed. 
Success of the self-organization model: the 
case of Alanya Turkey. Ostrom (1990) presents a 
case study of the Alanya inshore fishery, as 
described by Berkes (1986), where the following 
rules allotting fishing sites among about 100 
fishers had evolved over more than a decade:  
 
• Each September, a list of the licensed 
fishers is prepared. 
• Locations are named and listed so that 
each is suitable for one fisher without 
congestion. 
• Locations are assigned to fishers for the 
period September-May by lottery to fish 
using traditional nets. 
• From September to January, fishers rotate 
locations eastward, and after January, 
they rotate westward. This gives all fishers 
equal opportunities. 
 
The agreement to a lottery limits fishing effort, 
and the rules on locations and the gear and 
location restrictions prevent dissipation of rent 
through overcapitalization. Cheating will be 
observed by the fishers in the best spots, and the 
few infractions are handled by fishers at the local 
coffeehouse. 
Ostrom views this model as a middle ground 
between privatization and centralization. 
 
Although this is not a private-property 
system, rights to use fishing sites and 
duties to respect these rights are well 
defined. And though it is not a centralized 
system, national legislation that has given 
such cooperatives jurisdiction of “local 
arrangements” has been used by 
cooperative officials to legitimize their role 
in helping to devise a workable set of 
rules. That local officials accept the signed 
agreement each year also enhances 
legitimacy. The actual monitoring and 
enforcing of the rules, however, are left to 
the fishers. (Ostrom, 1990, p. 20) 
 
Ostrom’s analysis of this case study, which 
consists of presenting the key features that solve 
the CPR problem, in fact constitutes a new 
bioeconomic model of a CPR fishery. The rules and 
methods of enforcement are the new constraints, 
and the fishermen then proceed to maximize their 
income. However, rent is not dissipated, and a 
profitable fishery is possible. Ostrom provides a 
summary of the key reasons for this success. 
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The system has the effect of spacing the 
fishermen far enough apart on the fishing 
grounds that the production capabilities of 
each site are optimized. All fishing boats 
have equal chances to fish at the best 
spots. Resources are not wasted searching 
for or fighting over a site. No signs of 
overcapitalization are apparent. (Ostrom, 
1990, p. 19) 
 
The simple Clark model described at the 
beginning of this section has been altered. By a 
combination of a limited number of licenses and 
allocation of fishing sites the total fishing effort 
has been reduced below the rent-dissipating level 
∞E 	  of equation 3. Even in the case of a fishery 
where total catch has been restricted to an optimal 
level, Clark has shown through simple 
bioeconomic models that suboptimal outcomes 
may still arise if fishermen have an incentive to 
overinvest to compete for a greater share of the 
fish (Clark, 2006). The allocation and rotation of 
sites have prevented this outcome in the Alanya 
fishery. 
If a formative evaluation of the management 
regime that included this fishery were conducted, 
we would argue for use of a bioeconomic model 
including the features that Ostrom has outlined in 
order to explain the success of the fishery and to 
ensure that the situation is maintained. 
Failure of the self-organization model: the 
cases of Bodrum and the Bay of Izmir Turkey. 
Ostrom (1990) presents case studies where 
institutional failure and fragility appear to have 
prevented a solution to CPR problems, and rent 
dissipation occurs as predicted by the Gordon 
model. 
Bodrum is about 400 kilometers west of 
Alanya, and in 1983 had a larger inshore fishery 
(about 400 fishers). According to Berkes (1986, p. 
76) it was a “textbook example of rent dissipation 
in a fishery.” Ostrom points out some key features 
absent in the Alanya case. Large trawlers, some 
built by Borum fishers with Turkish government 
encouragement, participated in the inshore fishery 
due to lack of enforcement of a 3-mile limit for 
such vessels. Their early success stimulated entry 
to the fishery. A boom in the tourist trade lured 
part-time fishers and charter boats into the 
fishery. 
The Bay of Izmir fishery, further north on the 
Aegean coast, has an even larger inshore fishery, 
with about 1800 fishers in 1983. Although in this 
case trawlers were excluded by the Turkish Coast 
Guard, internal division of the fishers into 
subgroups with conflicting interests prevented the 
emergence of effective self-regulation, resulting in 
a Gordon model CPR situation.  
While Ostrom does not develop formal 
mathematical bioeconomic models of these 
particular failures, she shows in her analysis of the 
CPR situation (Ostrom, 1990, pp. 14-18) how game 
theory models may be useful in understanding the 
potential for self-organization. She suggests that 
the failure of the Bodrum and Bay of Izmir 
fisheries was due to “large groups that were 
characterized by severe heterogeneity of interest 
and of relevant time horizons.” (Ostrom, 1990, p. 
146). Apparently, the costs of overcoming these 
were too great to permit self-organization. A 
political regime permitting low-cost enforceable 
agreements would be required. 
 
Potential	  Synergy	  between	  
Bioeconomic	  Modelling	  and	  Formative	  
Evaluation	  of	  Fisheries-­‐Related	  
Programs	  	  
 
The	  Role	  of	  a	  Bioeconomic	  Model	  
 
A bioeconomic model summarizes how a 
regulatory system (or lack of one) operates. In a 
normative setting, the model typically poses an 
optimization problem with constraints and 
demonstrates the solution of the problem. In a 
positive setting, the model may include multiple 
optimization problems for agents and their 
solution, as well as equilibrium conditions that are 
expected to be established in the fishery. 
Formative evaluations of a fisheries program could 
benefit from a bioeconomic model when an 
explicit and succinct description of the program’s 
function and how it accomplishes its goals is 
provided by the model. Such models could also be 
used to make predictions that would then be 
confronted with quantitative data. All of this 
would contribute to the evaluator’s understanding 
of the program and the extent to which it has been 
successful. To fulfill these expectations, the models 
must be realistic. We argue that qualitative 
methods used in the development of the models 
have the potential to provide local and 
institutional details that are vital to ensure 
realism. To support this argument, we provide 
examples from the theoretical literature followed 
by practical examples of our proposed modelling 
approach.  
 
	   	  





Elinor Ostrom’s work. In the previous section, we 
presented examples of how Ostrom used 
qualitative methods that are often part of 
formative evaluation methodology to develop 
better bioeconomic models. This type of work, 
with models enriched in a local context, could be 
useful in the formative evaluation of fisheries 
programs. Especially if the models were made 
more formal and explicit than in Ostrom’s 
illustrative examples, potential improvements in 
fisheries management might be based on their 
predictions. 
For example, in the cases of Bodrum and the 
Bay of Izmir discussed in the previous section, a 
management regime might facilitate the 
enforcement of agreements between the diverse 
groups in the area. In the Bodrum area, it appears 
that enforcement of a 3-mile limit to exclude large 
trawlers from the inshore fishery would be critical. 
Some form of licensing of those catering to the 
tourist industry might also be helpful. 
Extinction and property rights. Recently some 
controversy has arisen among leading academic 
fisheries economists and biologists about the 
incentives for private owners of a fisheries 
resource to deliberately “cash in” the resource by 
exploiting it to biological extinction. Articles 
appearing in the journal Science have questioned 
the realism of earlier bioeconomic models that 
demonstrate conditions under which exploiting a 
resource to extinction would be optimal for a 
private owner (Grafton, Kompass and Hilborn, 
2007; and Costello, Gaines and Lynham, 2008). A 
defense was then provided by the originators of 
the earlier results (Clark, Munro, and Sumaila, 
2008). 
Applied mathematician Colin Clark presented 
a bioeconomic model illustrating the potential for 
deliberate fishing to extinction (Clark, 1973 and 
1976). The model is based on what has become a 
classic formulation of dynamic renewable resource 
harvesting (Bjørndal and Munro, 2003). 
The problem is expressed as maximization of 




∞ − −= δ           (5) 
 
where p is the price of the harvested recourse, c(x) 
is the unit harvesting cost when the population 
level is x, assumed to be a non-increasing function 
of x, δ is the discount rate being used by the 




=  is assumed, such as 
that given by the logistic model in equation (1). 
Analyzing this model further, Clark (1973) 
showed that, assuming 0)( <ʹ′ʹ′ xF  (a condition 
referred to as purely compensatory growth) and a 
decreasing cost function with 0)( >ʹ′ʹ′ xc , 
necessary conditions for extinction as an optimal 
policy (for a private resource owner) are that:  
 
0)0( >− cp 	  and	   )0(F ʹ′>δ          (6) 
 
while the slightly stronger conditions: 
 
0)0( >− cp 	  and	   )0(2F ʹ′>δ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (7)	  
 
are sufficient. 
These conditions represent a profitable fishery 
when the stock is near depletion with a high 
discount rate relative to the intrinsic growth rate 
of the fish stock. 
The condition on the profitability of fishing at 
low stock levels depends on the relationship 
between the harvest rate, fishing effort, and the 
stock of fish. 
A very commonly used model (Bjørndal and 
Munro, 2003, pp. 157-158) is:  
 
qExh =    (8) 
 
where h is the harvest rate, E is effort, and q is a 
constant termed the catchability coefficient. This 
means that there is a linear relationship between 
h/E, or Catch per Unit of Effort (CPUE) as it is 
termed by biologists, and the stock level x. 
Consequently, the effort per unit of harvest is 
given by E/h = 1/qx, so that if the cost per unit of 
effort is b, then the cost per unit harvest at stock 
level x would be given by:  
 
qx
bxc =)(       (9) 
 
Clearly, equation (9) leads to costs of harvest that 
approach infinity as the stock gets small, ruling out 
the extinction conditions given by Clark. 
But, is this always a realistic model? Clark and 
Monroe claim that it may not be, citing 
quantitative empirical evidence against the linear 
relationship between CPUE provided by Cooke 
and Beddington (1984) and Mackinson, Sumaila, 
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and Pitcher (1997). Clark (2006) describes three 
cases where the model would not be realistic: 
 
1. Mobile pelagic species that school, 
maintaining local density. 
2. Immobile demersal species, evenly 
dispersed, and harvested progressively by 
draggers (much like loggers harvesting old-
growth forest). 
3. Migratory species that concentrate at 
certain stages in the migration. 
 
A specific example of how the catch per unit 
effort actually increased with a decline in stock is 
provided by Stevenson, Tissot and Dierking (2011). 
In their analysis of West Hawaii’s aquarium 
fishery, they reveal that, “Catch per unit effort and 
total catch of the most commonly targeted fish, 
yellow tang (Zebrasoma flavescens), have 
increased since the implementation of the MPAs 
[Marine Protected Area], yet its abundance has 
declined by 45% in areas open to aquarium fishing 
between 1999 and 2007.” (Stevenson et al., 2011, 
p. 813). Their analysis of fleet dynamics 
constitutes a bioeconomic model. When juvenile 
fish recruitment was perceived as weak, fishers 
would dive deeper and collect larger, older fish as a 
response. Generally the most efficient and 
experienced fishermen, highly motivated by job 
satisfaction derived from the aquarium fisher 
lifestyle, remained in the fishery, often adopting 
new technology such as GPS location. These 
factors combined to increase catch per unit effort 
in the face of declining stocks. The authors suggest 
that economic arguments showing barriers to 
biological extinction might not apply when fisher 
job satisfaction is strong in fisheries with declining 
stocks. 
Clark et. al. (2008) argue that the policy 
question relating to private ownership is closely 
related to the analysis discussed above, because 
optimal policy from the point of view of a social 
manager may be quite different from that of a 
private owner. They point out that “existence 
value” is a quintessential public good. They go on 
to suggest that “contingent valuation,” a survey-
based economic technique for the valuation of 
non-market resources, be used to measure 
existence value, which they then incorporate into 
the bioeconomic model explicitly. They 
demonstrate how this can lead to a situation where 
the social manager would conserve the resource 
while a private owner would not. They also point 
out that another well-known difference between 
the social manager and a private owner concerns 
the appropriate discount rate, which may be much 
lower for the social manager. 
Suppose that data relating harvest rate, effort, 
and stock levels were scarce. In this case, it might 
still be possible to interview fishers to get an 
understanding of the relationship between the cost 
of harvest and the stock. The empirical evidence, 
based on harvest rates, indicates that this may not 
increase steeply at low stock levels. Bjørndal and 
Munro (2003) suggest that, with schooling fish 
and modern fish-finding equipment, fishing can 
remain profitable even at declining stock levels. 
This appears to be a situation where qualitative 
data, consisting of key-informant interviews with 
fishermen, might reveal whether or not the cost of 
harvest would escalate with low stock levels. This 
would depend on the behavior of fish, the capture 
technology, and the degree of cooperation and 
information sharing between fishermen. 
Interviews with biologists might shed light on the 
realism of equation (8). This approach to 
developing the underlying bionomic model might 
form part of a formative evaluation of a program 
that involved property rights. 
Another very important issue is the 
assumption that 0)( <ʹ′ʹ′ xF . If this does not hold, 
then the growth curve may include a region where 
0)( <xF  for values of x near to x = 0. This 
implies a minimum viable population, a situation 
that would greatly increase the fragility of the 
population and the chance that it would be fished 
to extinction. Again, if quantitative data were not 
available for a particular fishery, qualitative data 
in the form of expert opinions from biologists in 
key-informant interviews might be used to 
determine how likely this would be. 
Stevenson et al. (2011) used interviews with 
fishermen to develop a model of fleet dynamics. 
For example, semi-structured in-person interviews 
were used to determine fisher age and fishing 
effort, pre-survey interviews obtained information 
about the social environment and perceptions 
surrounding the aquarium fishery, and in situ 
observations were used to document fishing 
methods. 
The issue of existence value under public 
ownership might also be explored using formative 
evaluation methods. Actual measurement of the of 
the existence value using contingent valuation 
would require survey methods, but key-informant 
interviews with fisheries managers might reveal 
evidence for such valuation, perhaps based on 
feed-back from public workshops and 
information-sharing activities. 
In cases where the bioeconomic model 
indicates that private sector control could lead to 
extinction, it appears that a program design 
feature ensuring sufficient public sector control to 
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protect the species would be vital. Clark et al. 
(2008) finish their paper with an argument that 
private sector influence over fisheries management 
through schemes such as Individual Transferable 
Quotas (ITQ) can be beneficial, but should be 
implemented in a way that ensures ultimate 
management control rests with the public sector. 
Stevenson et al. (2011) suggest that their fleet 
dynamics model could be used to improve a 
fisheries management program, saying that, “In 
particular, in addition to developing management 
plans based on reef-fish abundance or fish 
import/export data for the aquarium trade, our 
results show that it will be essential to understand 
how and where fishers operate.” (2011, p. 820). 
There appears to be potential here for a 
bioeconomic model to add value to formative 
evaluation of a management program. 
Modelling fisher behavior with logistic 
regression. In developing a model of three fishing 
communities in Yucatan, Mexico, Salas et al. 
(2004) have used qualitative data in specifying 
models. The choice of explanatory variables was 
based on initial interviews with selected fishers 
from the communities. The initial selection was a 
random 30% sample, although nonparticipation 
reduced this to 10% in two of the three 
communities studied. Fishers were asked about 
the main factors taken into consideration when 
choosing a target species. 













P  is the probability that a fisher chooses Si 
and Ti is a linear combination of variables involved 
in the choice. The coefficients in Ti are parameters 
that were estimated from data provided by fishers’ 
logbooks and economic data from the fisheries 
cooperatives.  
Two models of the form given by equation (10) 
were specified: an “economic model” based partly 
on literature indicating the importance of 
economic variables, and a “resource availability 
model” based on the key variables determined 
from the interviews. The explanatory variables for 
the economic model were previous revenues for 
each species, weather, travel costs, opportunity 
costs, and an indicator for the fisher’s community. 
The resource availability model substituted catch 
per unit effort for revenue. 
The model is potentially bioeconomic, since 
fishers reported on interspecies predation that 
affected the abundance of the prey species 
(lobster) when the predator (octopus) was 
underfished. 
Unfortunately, the authors do not provide 
details of the qualitative analysis that led to the 
selection of these variables, although they indicate 
that the set of numerical and categorical variables 
was based on a subset of commonly occurring 
reasons given in the interviews. As shown in 
Figure 1, the aforementioned study shows that 
qualitative data in this case could have also proved 
to be useful for further refinements of the model. 
For example, qualitative data could be used to 
ensure that the most accurate opportunity cost is 
used in the model. In the Salas et al. study, 
opportunity cost of labor was considered as the 
minimum wage per day in the region. However, 
using qualitative data, an analyst might be able to 
detect if wage per day assumptions have varied 
since previous trials or if new factors are 
intervening in the calculation of opportunity costs 
such as opportunities in the informal economy or 
the value of leisure time. 
The article concludes that successful fisheries 
management plans should be local in nature. As 
such, the collection of qualitative data to properly 
develop and calibrate fisheries management 
models will most likely become more prevalent. 
The prediction of fishing effort allocation through 
these types of models might be useful in the 
formative evaluation of fisheries management 
programs. The authors also suggest that their 
analysis could be extended to examine spatial and 
temporal variation of the explanatory variables 
and suggest that further work could evaluate 
elements that contribute to rent dissipation in 




In this paper, we have presented evidence for a 
dual thesis: that the realism of bioeconomic 
models could be improved through the use of 
qualitative methods commonly used in formative 
evaluation, and also that such models, especially if 
realistic and specific to a situation, have the 
potential to improve formative evaluation. Based 
on evidence that verifying and testing underlying 
assumptions are necessary requirements to obtain 
accurate and realistic bioeconomic models, we 
explored the benefits of using the synergies 
between bioeconomic modelling and formative 
evaluations. The inductive approach, which often 
characterizes formative evaluations due to the use 
of qualitative information, can assist in defining 
the appropriate parameters of bioeconomic 
models. Inductive methodologies used in 
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formative evaluations can, through a feedback 
loop, also help ensure that assumptions and 
parameters of an existing bioeconomic model are 
relevant (see Figure 1). For example, the paper 
provides evidence that bioeconomic models 
without the potential for species extinction under 
management regimes involving private resource 
ownership could prove to be incorrect. We have 
argued that if an inductive method, based on 
qualitative data, were used to revisit the model 
specification, the model deficiencies, which hinge 
on the assumption of a linear relationship between 
Catch Per Unit Effort (CPUE) and the stock level, 
might be revealed. Similarly, formative 
evaluations, whose objective is usually to assess if 
the implementation of a program is successful and 
to suggest potential improvements, can be 
bolstered by the deductive methods of 
bioeconomic models. We have argued that the 
development and refinement of a bioeconomic 
model in this way would provide a useful tool in 
making recommendations for improvement of 
fisheries management programs in particular. 
Examples were provided as evidence that 
bioeconomics models tailored to assess a local 
fisheries program could provide a robust line of 
evidence in formative evaluation. In this way, 
formative evaluations could be improved through 
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